CITATION — REFERENCE ENTRY

Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility — Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory

Revision da9511fa-8b77-43cc-9b47-3cfc6579b747 · 3/24/2026, 8:17:10 PM UTC
Key
gibbard1978counterfactuals
Authors
Gibbard, Allan; Harper, William L.
Issued
1978
Type
chapter
Container
Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory
Publisher
D. Reidel
Publisher place
Dordrecht
Pages
125-162
Raw CSL JSON
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  "type": "chapter",
  "title": "Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility",
  "author": [
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      "family": "Gibbard"
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    {
      "given": "William L.",
      "family": "Harper"
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  "editor": [
    {
      "given": "C. A.",
      "family": "Hooker"
    },
    {
      "given": "J. J.",
      "family": "Leach"
    },
    {
      "given": "E. F.",
      "family": "McClennen"
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  "issued": {
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        1978
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  "container-title": "Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory",
  "publisher-place": "Dordrecht"
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Claims

  1. CDT was partly motivated by the failure of evidential-style reasoning in Newcomb-like cases: because one-boxers almost always find $1,000,000 and two-boxers almost always find only $1,000, many philosophers treat the evidential dominance of one-boxing as a significant consideration, while CDT proponents argue the decision cannot causally affect the already-set box contents.
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