CITATION — REFERENCE ENTRY
Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility — Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory
- Key
- gibbard1978counterfactuals
- Authors
- Gibbard, Allan; Harper, William L.
- Issued
- 1978
- Type
- chapter
- Container
- Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory
- Publisher
- D. Reidel
- Publisher place
- Dordrecht
- Pages
- 125-162
Raw CSL JSON
{
"page": "125-162",
"type": "chapter",
"title": "Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility",
"author": [
{
"given": "Allan",
"family": "Gibbard"
},
{
"given": "William L.",
"family": "Harper"
}
],
"editor": [
{
"given": "C. A.",
"family": "Hooker"
},
{
"given": "J. J.",
"family": "Leach"
},
{
"given": "E. F.",
"family": "McClennen"
}
],
"issued": {
"date-parts": [
[
1978
]
]
},
"publisher": "D. Reidel",
"container-title": "Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory",
"publisher-place": "Dordrecht"
}
Claims
-
CDT was partly motivated by the failure of evidential-style reasoning in Newcomb-like cases: because one-boxers almost always find $1,000,000 and two-boxers almost always find only $1,000, many philosophers treat the evidential dominance of one-boxing as a significant consideration, while CDT proponents argue the decision cannot causally affect the already-set box contents.
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